1982) (rejecting the contention that racial epithets that have been widespread within the defendant’s business could not set up a hostile work environment based mostly on race). Haw. 2014) (threats of deportation contributed to a hostile work setting); Chellen v. John Pickle Co., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1999); see additionally Reeves, 594 F.3d at 803, 812-13 (holding that the plaintiff, the only lady working on the sales ground, may establish a sexually hostile work surroundings based on vulgar, intercourse-based mostly conduct, regardless that the conduct had begun before she entered the office); Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 202 See Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. 194 See EEOC v. Glob. 191 See EEOC v. Mgmt. 197 See EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 318 (4th Cir. 192 Cf. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-sixty five (ninth Cir. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. Sheriff’s Off., 525 F.3d 1013, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 8 (11th Cir. Mar. 28, 2024) (concluding that working as a corrections officer, which is a “dangerous and sometimes” violent context, made the intentional misgendering and other harassment that a transgender male correctional officer skilled more extreme than it could have been in different contexts); Jenkins v. Univ.
1997) (concluding that a reasonable individual in the plaintiff’s position may have found the work setting hostile the place the supervisor’s remarks had been uninvited, intrusive, and continued even after the worker informed her supervisor that his feedback have been inappropriate). 2011) (concluding that the plaintiff established that his supervisor’s conduct was unwelcome the place, amongst other things, the plaintiff twice unequivocally rejected his supervisor’s sexual propositions), and EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. Hosp. of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 429, 433 (seventh Cir. 198 Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. Robinson Worldwide, 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (sixth Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring partly, dissenting in part) (stating that a female worker mustn’t have to assume the danger of a hostile work setting by voluntarily entering a workplace by which sexual conduct abounds); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1359 (eleventh Cir.
2012) (stating that the ten-yr age disparity between the teenage complainant and the older harasser, coupled together with his authority over her, could have led a rational jury to conclude that the harassment resulted in a hostile work environment). 2012) (concluding that a correctional officer presented sufficient proof to show that she adequately communicated to the chief deputy that his conduct was unwelcome where she advised him that she was uncomfortable continuing their relationship and that she was involved that she would lose her job if she ended their relationship, given that she knew that other feminine workers have been fired after ending their relationships with him), Pérez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc., 656 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 201 Compare Souther v. Posen Constr., Inc., 523 F. App’x 352, 355 (6th Cir. Minn., 838 F.3d 938, 946 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (stating that a “member of a protected group cannot be forced to endure pervasive, derogatory conduct and references which might be gender-specific within the workplace, just because the workplace could also be otherwise rife with typically indiscriminate vulgar conduct”); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 662 (6th Cir. 203 See, e.g., Christian v. Umpqua Bank, 984 F.3d 801, 806-07, 811 (ninth Cir.